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Abstract 
_________________________________________________________________ 
The educational system of Argentina has undergone a process of decentralization 
along with a steady growth in private schools enrolment. This complex process is 
usually  subsumed  under  the  general  concept  of  ‘privatization’.  We  have  considered  
it necessary to provide a deeper understanding of the multiple dimensions this 
process of privatization encompasses. In this article we intend to analyze and reflect 
upon the transformations of the Argentine educational system and to understand the 
specific levels and aspects where privatization has taken place. We note that the 
public and the private sectors seem to have experienced divergent trajectories with 
compromising effects in terms of equity and social cohesion. We argue that the 
uneasy coexistence of a deregulated independent private sector and a hyper-
regulated public sector is the result of a partial and inadequate implementation of a 
public-private partnership scheme. 
Key words: privatization, inequalities, public-private partnerships, Argentina 
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Resumen 
_________________________________________________________________ 
En las últimas décadas, el sistema educativo Argentino ha experimentado un 
proceso de descentralización acaecido en paralelo de un proceso de crecimiento de 
la matrícula en las escuelas privadas. Este complejo proceso ha sido usualmente 
subsumido bajo fenómeno demasiado   general   de   ‘privatización’. Para obtener un 
conocimiento cabal de estos cambios, consideramos necesario presentar y distinguir 
las múltiples dimensiones que el proceso de privatización engloba. Este artículo 
pretende analizar y reflexionar sobre la transformación del sistema educativo 
argentino y entender los niveles y aspectos específicos en los que se llevó a cabo la 
privatización. Advertimos que tanto el sector privado como el sector público han 
experimentado trayectorias divergentes con efectos negativos en términos de 
equidad y cohesión social. Argumentamos que la difícil convivencia entre un sector 
privado independiente desregulado, y un sector público híper-regulado ha sido el 
resultado de una implementación parcial e inadecuada de una alianza público-
privada. 
_______________________________________________________________ 
Palabras clave: privatización, inequidades, alianzas público-privadas, Argentina.
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he consolidation of national States and especially the 
strengthening of its disciplinary and cohesion power at the end of 
the XIX century created the conditions for the establishment of 
educational systems. These educational systems, modeled on the guidelines 
of the XVII century, reached its proliferation peak it the mid XX century. 
The statalization of corporative educational practices during the first half of 
the XX century was not an easy path (Archer, 1979; Foucault, 2009; 
Narodowski & Báez, 2006). Far from the relative autonomy characteristic of 
the previous corporative model, the new paradigm of education as a 
‘common   good’   set up the stage for a scaffolding of epistemological 
discipline and state control over the underage population. The resulting 
configuration of these educational systems allowed for the centrality of the 
State in terms of provision, administration and financing.  
However, since 1960s this educational scenario dominated by the State 
started to experience a slow process of change. In the context of the fiscal 
crisis of the State (O’Connor,   1973) and of its weakening legitimacy, 
governments started to evidence serious difficulties to provide free education 
for the whole population. The educational utopia of equality was 
undermined by the financial constraints of the State to realize its ever 
expanding welfare policies, thus reflecting a growing contradiction between 
its basic functions of accumulation and legitimation. It is in this sense that 
the state fiscal crisis and the deep cultural shifts associated with post-
modernism posed a constant challenge for the traditional closed 
configuration of educational systems (Narodowski, 2005). 
Educational systems underwent major transformations consistent with the 
development of new logics of organizations. The resulting outstanding 
features were the sustained growth of non-state agents and the restructuring 
of functions traditionally attributed to the State. This de-statalization process 
(Jessop, 2002) has certainly not been uniform, even when all the 
consequences of its polymorphic nature are usually subsumed under the 
quite  general  notion  of  ‘privatization’.  In  fact,  the  privatization  policies  and  
processes that shape the current transformation of national educational 
systems result from and in turn create trajectories that are much more 
T
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heterogeneous and multifaceted than those that characterized its 
configuration in the XIX century. It is actually to a great extent its own 
heterogeneous nature that poses complex challenges to the fundamental 
premises of equity and social cohesion (Levin et al., 2013). 
Several studies have tried to analyze the phenomenon of privatization of 
education as a necessary consequence of the emergence of neoliberalism 
(Giroux, 2005; Ball & Youdell, 2008; Klees, 2008, among others). However, 
considering the cultural-historical dynamics that have determined the 
prevalence of privatization processes, neoliberalism appears as the expected 
and trivial discursive correlate of a process that responds to deeper 
consensus and networks of significance. As such, the privatization processes 
would appear as inevitable while demanding the States ad hoc coordination 
efforts to avoid decomposition and fragmentation as proven negative 
consequences (Narodowski & Moschetti, 2015a). 
Therefore, the general and frequent use of the concept of privatization 
calls for the construction of theoretical frameworks that allow to disassemble 
its components and to comprehend its nature, variants and implications for 
each national context.  In this vein, based on the original conceptualizations 
of Belfield and Levin (2002) and Ball and Youdell (2008), Bellei and 
Orellana (2014) have tried to build a framework that we consider extremely 
valuable since it affords a basis for understanding the transversality and 
multipolarity of privatization processes. In this article, we have attempted to 
reflect upon the transformations that the Argentine education system has 
been subject to, and to analyze its resulting configuration in light of the 
categories offered by this theoretical framework. The complex nature of the 
process of privatization of education in Argentina makes it an interesting 
case study since it has been the scenario for governed and ungoverned 
processes, driven and occurred by default, which have brought about serious 
consequences in terms of equity and social cohesion (Tiramonti, 2003; 
Gasparini; Jaume; Serio; Vázquez, 2011). The de-statalization of the once 
monolithic educational system has engendered heterogeneity without 
precedents. It is this heterogeneity that demands a thorough analysis in view 
of producing further improvements to regulatory frameworks that would 
mitigate the dynamics of segregation.  
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A Comprehensive Framework for the Evaluation of the  
Privatization of Education 
 
From a Dichotomous Approach to a Gradual Perspective  
The traditional and mutually excluding public-private distinction that has 
characterized a vast majority of research work on privatization appears to 
have become less and less operational (Burch, 2009; Robertson et al., 2012). 
The growing complexity and sophistication of both educational policies and 
the answers provided by different actors -either to the policies themselves o 
to the lack of them- make it compelling to reconceive the public-private 
dichotomy from a gradual and multi-level perspective. 
In a first approximation, Ball and Youdell (2008) distinguish between 
two forms of privatization. On the one hand, the authors state that exogenous 
privatization or privatization of education  involves  ‘the  opening  up  of  public  
education   services   to   private   sector   participation’. On the other hand, 
endogenous privatization or privatization in education involves   ‘the  
importing of ideas, techniques and practices from the private sector in order 
to make the public sector more like businesses and more business-like’  
(2008, p. 74). Even when this first distinction manages to conceptualize the 
complexity of the phenomenon, it is still trapped within the original 
dichotomous approach. Therefore, and without disregarding the dynamics of 
the categorization of Ball and Youdell (2008), Bellei and Orellana (2014) 
highlight the value of the definition of privatization as stated by Belfield and 
Levin (2002) based on the grounds that it offers a wider perspective to 
understand the current public-private scenarios in the field of education. 
According  to  this  approach,  ‘privatization  is  the  transfer  of  activities,  assets  
and responsibilities from government/public institutions and organizations to 
private   individuals   and   agencies’   (2002, p.19). The general nature of this 
definition makes it more flexible to understand the complex forms of 
privatization. Besides, it is also of much help to differentiate between what 
happens at the school level, and at the educational system level. 
Based on both these definitions and a discussion on the inherently public-
private meanings of education, and the many ways in which education can 
be  ‘privatized’,  Bellei  and  Orellana (2014) build two complex categories that 
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allow for a characterization of the specific levels and aspects where 
privatization takes place. In the following section, we will briefly discuss 
these two categories that we use in our analysis.  
Internal Privatization of Public Education  
 
As stated by Bellei and Orellana (2014), public schools can remain being 
formally public even after incorporating resources or services from private 
agents. This perspective allows for identifying the internal dimensions that 
may be privatized.  On an organizational basis, the importance of each of 
these dimensions for schools and the degree to which private agents are 
involved would bring about schools either more o less privatized. Likewise, 
an educational system would be more or less privatized depending on the 
extent to which the presence of private agents in these dimensions is more or 
less widespread and institutionalized. 
 The authors identify three internal dimensions where private agents can 
be involved: 
i. Inputs and services: these include the control and maintenance of the 
schools’  infrastructure,  alternative  sources  of  financing,  acquisition  of  
non-educational services and educational materials, and the 
introduction of private professional services. 
ii. Management: it implies distinguishing  between  ‘who’  makes  the  decision  
and  ‘what’  decisions  are  made  regarding,  for  example,  teacher  hiring,  
the definition of school curriculum and teaching method, decisions 
about  enrolment  and  students’  admission  process,  the  decision  to  open  
or close a school, among others.  
iii. Relationship with families: the type of relationship between schools and 
families can be considered a dimension for privatization in that 
schools may or may not adapt to the preferences and interests of their 
‘customers’.  Ultimately, this relationship is given by the way in which 
three key issues are resolved: the degree of school choice, the need to 
pay for school, and the degree of control that families have on the 
functioning of schools (Bellei & Orellana, 2014, p.16). 
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Open Privatization of Education  
In contrast to privatization within public schools, open privatization implies 
‘the   complete   transfer   of   control   and   management   (and   eventually  
ownership)  of  a  public  school  to  a  private  agent’  (Bellei & Orellana, 2014, 
p.18). As pointed out by the authors, this has not been a widespread practice 
in Latin America, with the exception of a few cases. However, several 
countries in the region have experienced a similar large-scale phenomenon 
which has produced analogous results: the increment of the proportion of 
students in private schools. Some governments have supported this 
phenomenon with the implementation of incentives for the creation of 
private school provision. The cornerstones of these polices have been the 
transfer of public financial resources to private schools, and the 
establishment of legal requirements for the beneficiary institutions. As in the 
case of internal privatization processes, absolute categories are not valid for 
open privatization either. In fact, the interplay between these two elements -
public resources and regulations- give rise to multiple variants of the open 
privatization general scheme. Below, we provide a brief description of the 
nature and central aspects of these two elements. 
i. Resources: (a) Free-disposition financing that private agents can use 
according to their own interests and needs; (b) Categorical funds: 
restricted-use resources that private agents can use but following 
governmental requirements stated beforehand (for instance, for buying 
teaching materials or books, or for contracting professional services 
for teacher training); (c) Provision of materials and services.  
ii. Public requirement for private schools: governments may not impose 
additional requirements on schools receiving public resources. 
However, this is not generally the case apart from some exceptions. 
Additional requirements usually concern: admission policies (increase 
accessibility, unrestricted access, among others); adoption of rules that 
operate for public schools (teaching the official curriculum, hiring of 
teachers following the public sector labour law), and educational 
achievements (schools must attain a defined level of educational 
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achievement as measured in standardized evaluations) (Bellei & 
Orellana, 2014, p.18). 
 
In Figure 1 we outline the conceptualization described above and present 
two ideal types of configuration for each category. These two ideal types 
only define the two   analytical   extremes   of   each   continuum   (‘privatized  
public   education’   and   ‘State   public   education’;;   and   ‘independent   private  
education’  and  ‘integrated  private  education’). 
 
 
 
Figure 1.  Internal privatization of public education and open privatization  
Source: Own preparation based on Bellei and Orellana (2014). 
 
Internal Privatization: between Bureaucratization and Informality 
 
The Argentine educational system is currently federally organized. The 
origins of its federal structure can be traced back to a gradual 
decentralization process initiated in 1960s, continued in the 1990s and 
reaffirmed in 2006 with the sanction of the National Education Law (N° 26, 
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206) (Andrada, 2001). However, this decentralization process was in fact a 
process   of   ‘provincialization’   and   presents   differences   regarding   other  
decentralization processes on municipality or institutional level implemented 
in other countries. Accordingly, each of the 23 provinces and the City of 
Buenos Aires are responsible for the provision, administration and financing 
of their educational systems (Candia, 2004; Rivas, 2004). In a context of 
marked socioeconomic and demographic differences among provinces, this 
decentralization process has widened the achievement and coverage gap 
among the provincial educational systems (Rivas, 2010). The richest 
provinces even triple or quadruple public expenditure per student as 
compared to the poorest (CGECSE, 2015). 
By the mid-1950s, the public sector accounted for 95% of enrollment in 
compulsory schooling; the remaining 5% corresponded to private 
institutions that had no official recognition. The early development of public 
education made it possible that by 1950 the schooling rates were the highest 
for the region.  By 1955, 79% of the population between 14 and 17 years of 
age had completed primary school and by 1960s the net schooling rate for 
primary school was 85% (Morduchowicz et al., 1999; Rivas, Vera & Bezem, 
2010; Siteal, 2014). The 1960s were, however, a turning point regarding the 
re-organization of the governance structure of the system. Demand-side 
pressures, chronic fiscal crises, de-regulation policies, and new funding 
schemes gave rise to a process of expansion of private schooling that 
continues nowadays (Morduchowicz et al., 1999; Narodowski & Moschetti, 
2015a). This transformation will be analyzed in detail in the following 
section, nevertheless, a systemic comprehension of the privatization 
processes requires bearing in mind the link between internal and open 
privatization. Even when for analytic purposes we use a sequential approach, 
it is worth noting that there is a strong interdependence between the 
processes that take place in the public sector and those in the private sector. 
The Federal Education Law (N° 24,195) was passed in a context of 
intense national and regional debate centered on the need to redefine the role 
of the State. In the 1990s, the economic policy of most Latin American 
countries had a strong influence of free market arguments, the privatization 
of State companies and services, and the implementation of large-scale 
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market mechanisms in diverse areas of economic and social life. For the case 
of Argentina, during the Peronist administration of Carlos Menem (1989-
1999), many State companies and public services were privatized as 
stipulated by Law N° 23,696, known as State Reform Law. Water 
companies, gas, electricity, communications, postal service, ports, transport, 
among others, all were transferred to the private sector. In addition, salaries 
were kept virtually frozen throughout the decade and the unemployment rate 
peaked to unprecedented levels. As regards monetary policies, the 
Convertibility Law N° 23,928 established a US dollar-peso parity for all 
transactions that fostered the entry of goods and capital (Kiguel, 2002). In 
spite of the drastic changes introduced in 1990s, the educational system 
seemed to have remained outside of the scope of the so called State Reform. 
Based on the magnitude of the changes implemented in the provision and 
financing of other public goods, it was rather expected that the government 
would foster the substitution of the central bureaucratic educational 
governance structure   for   another   one   more   in   line   with   the   ‘new   public  
management’ agenda. The introduction of a new law of education could 
have been the driver of that change. However, as we shall see later, the 
Federal Education Law passed in 1993 did not subvert the structural 
organization of the Argentine educational system. 
The Federal Education Law took the discursive form of the time and 
introduced terminology that was so far unfamiliar to pedagogical thought 
(Cosse, 2001). The new discursivity included a technocratic framing and 
appealed for the participation of expert knowledge to achieve education 
quality, as measured by academic achievement standards. Standardized 
evaluations were thus implemented for the first time, and primary and 
secondary school cycles were modified in duration. Some provincial 
governments also launched some very modest initiatives of internal 
privatization   relative   to   the   ‘inputs   and   services’   dimension.   Some   school  
cafeterias and education advisory services were outsourced in line with the 
discourse of operational efficiency (Vior & Rodríguez, 2012). 
In the following decade, a new education law was passed replacing the 
Federal Education Law. The new National Education Law (26,206) changed 
the length of primary and secondary school cycles again and tried to 
dispense with the pro-market rhetoric introduced by the previous law. 
However, these changes did not lead to deeper structural changes in terms of 
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regulation, administration and financing of the education governance 
structure. The public-private scheme was revalidated under the new 
categories   of   ‘State-run   public   education’   (public   schools)   ‘privately-run 
public   education’   (private   schools).   State   subsidies   to   private   schools  
remained unmodified and no changes were introduced in terms of regulation, 
thus widening the gap between the hierarchical and bureaucratic model of 
the State sector, and the autonomous school-based management scheme of 
the private sector (Narodowski & Moschetti, 2015a; Narodowski & 
Andrada, 2001). 
These national laws tended to crystallize the decentralization processes of 
the previous decades. As for the national State, it centralized the activities 
concerned with the formulation of (very) general guidelines regarding 
educational policies and common core school contents while it made 
financing, planning and administration of education subject to definition at 
the provincial level. In fact, the major changes involved the transfer of 
national bureaucracies to the provincial level (Narodowski & Andrada, 
2000). However, from the perspective of school management, it was only 
about a jurisdictional transfer: the institutional practices remained 
substantially unaltered. 
When   analyzing   Bellei   and   Orellana’s   (2014) dimensions of 
‘management’  and  ‘relationship  with  families’  in  the  case  of  public  schools,  
we note the persistence of a combination of bureaucratic and informal 
mechanisms that have tended to polarize or even further disassemble the 
system. This is reflected in various dimensions of the institutional praxis: a) 
funding; b) curricular definition; c) teacher hiring; and   d)   students’  
enrollment.  We will now analyze these dimensions sequentially even 
though in fact they may overlap or even be causally connected. 
As regards funding, public schools autonomously manage very limited 
resources. Each provincial administration centralizes teacher wage 
payments, which typically represent about 90% of the budget of each school. 
The remaining 10% that is managed by each school does not offer scope to 
carry out actions beyond the purchase of consumable supplies. The 
structurally limited nature of these resources is worsened by the fact that 
budgetary possibilities are unequally distributed among provinces. 
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Additionally, this macro-level disparity also replicates at the micro-level as a 
consequence of the growing role of parents' associations (cooperativas) in 
the economic sustainability of each establishment (Veleda, 2005). Naturally, 
schools serving socioeconomically advantaged families will have more 
resources available than those in working-class contexts. 
With regard to curriculum definitions –which are closely bound to the 
nature of funding mechanisms–,   public   schools’   pedagogical   proposals  
rarely expand or go beyond the general curricular guidelines formulated at 
national or sub-national level. The regulations and budgetary constraints 
these schools are subject to make it virtually impossible to implement any 
type of innovation or to provide extracurricular activities (Scialabba, 2006). 
As for teacher recruitment processes, public schools are not entitled to select 
their own staff or set teacher salaries. The allocation of teachers follows 
bureaucratic criteria. Teachers enroll in an official list whose ranking is 
determined mainly by seniority as a proxy for merit, and then assigned 
according to the job vacancies through official job placement calls.  
Consequently, teachers with more seniority have greater decision-making 
power regarding the schools they want to work in, and the heads of the 
schools are left with no voice in the definition of their work teams. As 
evidence  has  shown,  teachers  with  more  seniority  usually  choose  the  ‘best’  
schools   and   leave   ‘second-best’   schools,   i.e.   schools   with   vulnerable  
population, for the less experienced teachers (Poliak, 2004). However, and in 
spite of the regulations in force, school practices show the existence of 
informal mechanisms that tend to subvert the rigid bureaucratic structure. 
Certain middle-class schools with management teams that have greater 
knowledge about the interstices of the central bureaucratic administration are 
better positioned to informally introduce greater leeway (Narodowski & 
Andrada, 2000). 
Regarding student enrollment procedures, all jurisdictions implement 
some kind of restriction in order to balance supply and demand for 
schooling. These regulations include zoning, internal articulation of school 
levels offered by a single school, and priority given to family groups 
(Andrada, 2001). However, several authors reveal that in some cases both 
parents and school authorities have managed to develop informal strategies 
to avoid these regulations. Among the diverse strategies deployed by parents 
are: charging a high fee for   the   parents’   association   (cooperativas) –thus 
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building social class representations even when payment is not compulsory–; 
not providing free meals so as to exclude the vulnerable population; and the 
assessment of academic background in order to select high-performing 
students, among other discretionary practices (Veleda, 2005; Andrada, 2001; 
Narodowski & Andrada, 2000; Krüger, 2012). As for families, particularly 
in the case of those belonging to the middle and upper-middle classes, 
strategies are diverse and rooted in their advantageous social position. Even 
when these sectors have largely abandoned the public school, some have 
tended   to   strategically   ‘colonize’   certain   public   schools   and   exclude   the  
vulnerable population. These strategies, which reveal the existence of de 
facto market mechanisms, usually evolve into certain families making 
private use of public goods. In this vein, the equality of opportunities 
theoretically granted by the public school system seems to become gradually 
permeated by informal processes of internal privatization (Veleda, 2005; 
Narodowski & Andrada, 2000; Gottau, 2014). 
 
Open Privatization: between Default and Incentives  
 
 As we mentioned above, there have not been direct transfers of public 
educational institutions to private entities in Argentina. Notwithstanding, the 
1960s  opened  a  complex  process  of  enrollment  ‘drift’  to  private  institutions  
that continues today (Morduchowicz, 2005). The public-private subdivision 
and re-articulation of the Argentine educational system has been understood 
as a viable answer to the financial restrictions imposed by decline of the 
welfare State and the need to expand school coverage (Narodowski, 2008). 
This process of expansion of private school provision has been in constant 
growth since its beginning in the 1960s. The private enrollment rate for 
common education (kindergarten, primary, secondary and tertiary-non 
university) reached 28.9% in 2013 (DiNIECE, 2014), the highest peak in the 
last 100 years. In order to see similar private school rates it is necessary to 
go as far back as the decades previous to the consolidation of national 
educational systems in the XIX century.  
The post-1960 expansion of private education took place as a series of new 
regulations and de-regulations  for  the  sector  were  passed.  The  governments’  
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intense   ‘regulatory   activity’   throughout   the   period   could   be   seen   as   the  
consequence of a combination of demand and supply-side pressures, i.e. 
families and private/religious agents (Morduchowicz, 2005). However, there 
are reasons to believe that the State had itself its own structural reasons to 
allow –and even foster– the expansion of the private sector (Narodowski & 
Moschetti, 2015b). The resulting regulatory framework, which was later 
countersigned by the 1993 and 2006 education laws, guaranteed the 
continuity and stability of private schools, the official recognition of private 
school teachers as stated by the Teachers Statute, the validity of the 
certificates issued by private schools, and the allocation of State subsidies 
(Morduchowicz et al., 1999).  
The allocation of public funding to private schooling has been a key factor 
to its expansion. The system was created in 1947 under the first presidency 
of Juan D. Perón (Law 13,047). Originally, it had at least two purposes: to 
provide financial help to private schools that did not have the resources to 
pay   for   teachers’   salaries,   vacations   and   social   security   expenses,   and   to  
ensure that these schools, which usually served very vulnerable population 
in places where there were no public schools, remained open. Even though it 
was first designed as a temporary policy, it later became more and more 
systematic and clarified in successive decrees (Nº 15 of 1964 and Nº 2,542 
of 1991, among others) (Mezzadra & Rivas, 2010). Currently, each province 
may finance between 40% to   100%   of   private   schools’   expenditure   on  
teachers’  salaries  and  the  majority  of  private  schools  are  in  fact  subsidized  to  
some extent. Every province has a similar regulatory framework that 
establishes a series of criteria so as to define which schools are eligible for 
receiving the subsidy and in what proportion. These criteria usually include 
the   SES   of   the   pupils’   families,   and   the   proximity   and   availability   of   a  
similar State schooling alternative. However, these criteria are neither 
comprehensive nor thoroughly operationalized in the legislation. In this vein, 
some studies note that the decisions finally rest on the good judgment and 
discretion of the State bureaucracy, and suggest the existence of a series of 
informal practices (Morduchowicz 1999; Mezzadra & Rivas, 2010).  
According to the latest data available, 65% of private institutions in the 
country benefit from State funding to some extent.  In the case of the 
Province of Buenos Aires, this percentage reaches 73%, and in the City of 
Buenos Aires, 74% (Rivas, 2010; Mezzadra & Rivas, 2010; Moschetti, 
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2015). Research on this matter suggests the inexistence of any formal 
equitable mechanism to assess school eligibility. In the case of the Province 
of Buenos Aires, for instance, research has shown that while there is some 
overall progressivity between the amount of subsidies that schools receive 
and the income level of the families they serve, there are also evidences 
significant   inconsistencies:      ‘17%   of   schools   within   the   poorest   tercile  
receive less than 50% of State subsidy. In turn, 16% of schools within the 
highest tercile receive more than 75% of  State  contributions’  (Mezzadra & 
Rivas, 2010, p. 58).  
Regarding the functioning of non-State schools, some studies suggest that 
the high level of autonomy and flexibility derived from current regulations, 
makes it possible for some of these schools to provide an educational offer 
in line with class-related representations of quality, thus creating, to a certain 
extent, their own demand. Unlike public schools, private schools have 
complete autonomy in the process of hiring (and firing) teachers. Private-
school owners or principals usually conduct business-like recruitment and 
selection processes that allow them to build more consistent pedagogical 
teams (Andrada, 2001; Narodowski & Andrada, 2000; Morduchowicz, 
2005).  
As   for   students’   enrollment,   catchment   areas   do   not   apply   for   private  
schools. Parents are free to send their children to any private school –with or 
without State funding– regardless of their residence or chosen school 
location.  However,   this   freedom   is  conditioned  by  each   family’s  economic  
capacity to afford schools fees, which can vary significantly from low fee to 
elite private schools, totally or partially subsidized, or non subsidized at all 
(Narodowski, 2002; Narodowski, Moschetti & Gottau, 2016). 
The de-regulation of the private sector and the hyper-regulation of the 
State sector (Narodowski, 2002) have led to the configuration of a 
disintegrated system: an ‘independent’   private   subsystem   coupled   with   a  
‘State’   public   subsystem.  As   regards   the   first   one,   de-regulation applies to 
the private subsector as a whole, regardless of the State subsidies.  In the 
case of the State public sector, hyper-regulation is, however, no barrier for 
some well-off families who resort to informal practices and make a private 
use  of   some   ‘prestigious’  public   schools. Nonetheless, this phenomenon is 
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quantitatively insignificant: there is conclusive evidence regarding the 
virtually unanimous exit of the middle and upper- middle classes from 
public schools, especially in urban contexts (Narodowski, Moschetti & 
Gottau, 2016).  The  widely  spread  perception  of  private  schools  as  of  ‘better  
quality’  (Scialabba, 2006) has pushed middle and high-income families out 
of the public subsector. The prevalence and permanence of low-income 
families in the public subsector evidences a highly segregated educational 
system (Narodowski & Nores, 2000; Gasparini, Jaume, Serio & Vázquez, 
2011). 
 
Conclusions 
 
In this article we have tried to describe all the major transformations that the 
Argentine educational system has undergone especially during the second 
half of the twentieth century. More specifically, we have presented a 
characterization of the different forms adopted by the underlying education 
governance structure as from the reconfiguration driven by pro-privatization 
and de-regulation policies. Drawing on the conceptualization offered by 
Bellei & Orellana (2014), we have observed the multiple aspects and levels 
where privatization processes have taken place and the inter-relation and 
bonds among them. Likewise, we have noted that these privatization 
processes can originate either as a consequence of concrete educational 
policies or by default, i.e the lack of them. 
Reaching a thorough comprehension of the dynamics between the sectors 
of an educational system is essential to ensure equitable provision and better 
quality education for all (Bangay & Latham, 2013). The disassembling 
process that we have described for the Argentine case stems from the fact 
that the public sector and the private sector seem to have gone through very 
divergent trajectories, with compromising effects on the system as a whole 
in terms of equity and social cohesion. On the one hand, the private sector 
has evolved into a relatively independent structure where schools are not 
refrained  from  acting  according  to  the  general  guidelines  of  a  ‘school-based 
management’   scheme. On the other hand, the public sector is subject to 
pedagogical and administrative regulations as stated by the central State 
bureaucracy. In comparison, we describe the private sector as de-regulated 
and independent and the public sector as hyper-regulated and State-bound. 
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The consequences of these divergent trajectories have been quite drastic. 
The de-regulation of the private sector has advantaged private schools to 
develop greater capacity, flexibility and room for innovation in terms of 
curricular design, teacher training, team-building and collaboration 
networks. To a great extent, private schools have managed to provide a 
pedagogical offer more in line with the interests of their communities, and as 
such, much more attractive than public schools, at least in a customer 
satisfaction sense  (Scialabba, 2006). It is partly as a consequence of the 
rigid  regulatory  framework  that  the  public  sector  has  become  a  ‘second  best’ 
option. As observed, this practice and discourse decoupling process seem to 
have been powered by two distinct general types of behavior with strong 
segregational effects. First, a virtually unanimous exit of the middle and 
upper-middle classes from public schools made possible by means of the 
creation of a large-scale private subsidized subsector (Narodowski & 
Moschetti, 2015b). Second, research has evidenced the proliferation of 
certain informal practices inside the public subsector that end up, 
paradoxically, turning public goods into an arena for unfair competition and 
internal privatization. 
In general terms, the Argentine educational system seems to be 
experiencing the consequences of an inadequately implemented and poorly 
regulated private/public partnership. In line with Woodhead et al. (2013), 
this type of configuration raises the risk to the achievement of equity and 
therefore requires structural reforms in the State sector and greater regulation 
among private providers, especially those strongly subsidized by the State. 
 
References 
 
Archer, M. (1979). Social Origins of Educational Systems. London: Sage. 
Andrada, M. (2001). Retórica y realidad de las políticas de autonomía 
escolar y participación de las familias en Argentina. Teias, 2(4), 1-12. 
Retrieved from 
http://www.periodicos.proped.pro.br/index.php/revistateias/article/view/8
2 
HSE – Social and Education History, 5(2)   
 
 
129 
Ball, S. J. & Youdell, D. (2008). Hidden privatisation in public education. 
Brussels: Education International. 
Bangay, C. & Latham, M. (2013). Are we asking the right questions? 
Moving beyond the state vs non-state providers debate: Reflections and a 
Case Study from India. International Journal of Educational 
Development, 33(3), 244-252. doi:10.1016/j.ijedudev.2012.09.004 
Belfield, C. & Levin, H. (2002). Education privatization: causes, 
consequences and planning implications. Paris: Unesco. 
Bellei, C. & Orellana, V. (2014). What  does  “education  privatisation”  
mean? Conceptual discussion and empirical review of Latin American 
cases. ESP Working Paper Series N° 62. New York: Open Society 
Foundations. 
Burch, P. (2009). Hidden Markets: The New Education Privatization. New 
York: Routledge. 
Candia, A. N. (2004). Razones y estrategias de la descentralización 
educativa: un análisis comparado de Argentina y Chile. Revista 
Iberoamericana de educación, 34, 179-200. Retrieved from 
http://rieoei.org/rie34a06.htm 
Coordinación General de Estudio de Costos del Sistema Educativo 
(CGECSE). (2015). Ministerio de Educación, Ciencia y Tecnología. 
Retrieved from http://portales.educacion.gov.ar/dpe/costos-educativos-
cgecse/ 
Cosse,  G. (2001). Gasto educativo, eficiencia, eficacia y equidad en 
Argentina. 1990-1999. Bueno Aires: Ministerio de Educación. 
Dirección Nacional de Información y Evaluación de la Calidad Educativa 
(DiNIECE). (2015). Ministerio de Educación, Ciencia y Tecnología. 
Retrieved from http://diniece.me.gov.ar/ 
Foucault, M. (2009). Nacimiento de la biopolítica: curso del Collège de 
France (1978-1979). Madrid: Ediciones Akal.  
Gasparini, L., Jaume, D., Serio, M., & Vazquez, E.( 2011.) La segregación 
entre escuelas públicas y privadas en Argentina. Reconstruyendo la 
evidencia. Desarrollo Económico: Revista de Ciencias Sociales, 
51(202/203), 189-219. Retrieved from 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/23612381?seq=1 - page_scan_tab_contents 
Giroux, H. A. (2005). The Terror of Neoliberalism: Rethinking the 
Significance of Cultural Politics. College Literature, 32(1), 1-19. 
   Gottau & Moschetti– Between open and internal 
privatization 
 
 
130 
Retrieved from 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/25115243?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents 
Gottau, V. (2014). Los que se quedan. Un estudio sobre padres y madres de 
clase media de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires que eligen escuela pública. 
M.A. diss. Buenos Aires: Universidad Torcuato Di Tella. 
Jessop, B. (2002). Liberalism, Neo-Liberalism and Urban Governance: A 
State Theoretical Perspective. Antipode, 34 (3), 452-472.  doi: 
10.1111/1467-8330.00250 
Kiguel, M. (2002). Structural Reforms in Argentina: Success or Failure? 
Comparative Economic Studies, 44 (2-3), 83-102. 
Klees, S. J. (2008). A quarter century of neoliberal thinking in education: 
misleading analyses and failed policies. Globalisation, Societies and 
Education, 6(4),  311-348. Retrieved from 
http://www.scielo.edu.uy/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1688-
74682012000100008 
Krüger, N. (2012). La segmentación educativa argentina: reflexiones desde 
una perspectiva micro y macro social. Páginas de Educación, 5(1), 137-
156. 
Levin, H. M., Cornelisz, I. & Hanisch-Cerda, B. (2013). Does educational 
privatisation promote social justice? Oxford Review of Education, 39(4), 
514-532. doi: 10.1080/03054985.2013.825983 
Mezzadra, F. & Rivas, A. (2010). Aportes estatales a la educación de gestión 
privada en la provincia de Buenos Aires. Buenos Aires: CIPPEC.  
Morduchowicz, A. et al. (1999). La educación privada en la Argentina: 
Historia, regulaciones y asignación de recursos públicos. Documento de 
Trabajo N. 38. Buenos Aires: Fundación Gobierno & Sociedad. 
Morduchowicz, A. (2005).Private education: funding and (de) regulation in 
Argentina. In: L. Wolff, J. C. Navarro, y P. González (Eds.) Private 
Education and Public Policy in Latin America. Washington DC: PREAL. 
Moschetti, M. (2015). Private education supply in disadvantaged areas of the 
City  of  Buenos  Aires  and  ‘low-fee  private  schooling’:  Comparisons,  
contexts and implications. Education Policy Analysis Archives, 23 (126), 
1-19.  
HSE – Social and Education History, 5(2)   
 
 
131 
Narodowski, M. (2005). Notas para comprender el currículo escolar en la 
actualidad. Revista Novedades Educativas, 18(180).  
Narodowski, M. & Báez, L. (2006). La reconfiguración de los sistemas 
educativos: Modos de salida del monopolio estatal. In: M. Narodowski y 
D. Brailovsky (Eds.) Dolor de escuela. Buenos Aires: Prometeo Libros. 
Narodowski, M. (2008). School Choice and Quasi-State Monopoly in 
Education Systems in Latin America: the case of Argentina. In: M. 
Forsey, S. Davies & G. Walford (Eds.) The Globalisation of School 
Choice. Oxford: Symposium Books. 
Narodowski, M. & Nores, M. (2000). ¿Quiénes quedan y quiénes salen? 
Características socioeconómicas en la composición de la matrícula en 
las escuelas públicas y en las escuelas privadas en la Argentina. Buenos 
Aires: Fundación Gobierno & Sociedad  Documento de Trabajo, 31.  
Narodowski, M. (2002). Socio-economic segregation in the Argentine 
education system: School choice without vouchers. Compare, 32(2), 181-
191. doi: 10.1080/03057920220143165 
Narodowski, M. & Andrada, M. (2002).Segregación socioeconómica y 
regulaciones en el sistema educativo argentino: el  caso de la provincia de 
Buenos Aires. Propuesta Educativa, 11(24).  
Naradowski, M. & Andrada, M. (2001). The privatization of education in 
Argentina. Journal of Education Policy, 16(6), 585-595. doi: 
10.1080/02680930110087834 
Narodowski, M. & Moschetti, M. (2015a). The growth of private education 
in Argentina: evidence and explanations. Compare: A Journal of 
Comparative and International Education, 45(1), 47-69.  
Narodowski, M. & Moschetti, M. (2015b). Why does private school 
enrollment grow? Evidence from Argentina. Cogent Education, 2(1), 
1077604. 
Narodowski, M., Gottau, V., & Moschetti, M. (2016). Quasi-State monopoly 
of the education system and socio-economic segregation in Argentina. 
Policy Futures in Education, ahead-of-print. 
doi: 10.1177/1478210316645016 
O’Connor,  J.  (1973).  The Fiscal Crisis of the State.  New  York:  St.  Martin’s  
Press. 
Poliak, N. (2004). Reconfiguraciones recientes en la educación media: 
escuelas y profesores en una geografía fragmentada. In: G. TIRAMONTI 
   Gottau & Moschetti– Between open and internal 
privatization 
 
 
132 
(Ed.) La trama de la desigualdad educativa. Mutaciones recientes en la 
escuela media. Buenos Aires: Manantial.  
Rivas, A. (2004). Gobernar la educación. Buenos Aires: Granica. 
Rivas, A. (2010). La ruta hacia la justicia y la transparencia de los aportes 
estatales a la educación de gestión privada. Documento de Políticas 
Públicas, Recomendación N. 86. Buenos Aires, CIPPEC.   
Rivas, A., Vera, A. & Bezem, P.(2010). Radiografía de la educación 
argentina. Buenos Aires: Cippec.  
Robertson, S., Verger, A., Mundy, K. & Menashy, F.  (2012). Public Private 
Partnerships in Education: New Actors and Modes of Governance in a 
Globalizing World. London: Edward Elgar.  
Scialabba, A. (2006). Evaluación de la educación por parte de la opinión 
pública y su conformidad con la educación pública y privada en la 
Cuidad de Buenos Aires. M.A. Diss., Buenos Aires: Universidad de San 
Andrés. 
Sistema de Información de Tendencias Educativas en América Latina 
(SITEAL). (2014). Retrieved from http://www.siteal.iipe-oei.org/ 
Tiramonti, G. (2003). Después de los 90: agenda de cuestiones educativas. 
Cadernos de Pesquisa, 119, 71-83. Retrieved from 
http://www.scielo.br/pdf/cp/n119/n119a04.pdf 
Veleda, C. (2005). Efectos segregatorios de la oferta educativa. El caso del 
conurbano bonaerense. Documento de Trabajo N.5. Buenos Aires, 
CIPPEC.   
Vior, S. & Rodríguez, L. (2012). La privatización de la educación Argentina: 
Un largo proceso de expansión y naturalización. Pro-Posições, 23(2), 91-
104. Retrieved from http://www.scielo.br/pdf/pp/v23n2/a07v23n2.pdf 
Woodhead, M., Frost, M.& James, Z. (2013). Does growth in private 
schooling contribute to Education for All? Evidence from a longitudinal, 
two cohort study in Andhra Pradesh, India. International Journal of 
Educational Development, 33(1), 65-73. 
doi:10.1016/j.ijedudev.2012.02.005 
 
HSE – Social and Education History, 5(2)   
 
 
133 
Veronica Gottau: Universidad de San Andrés (Argentina) 
Mauro Carlos Moschetti: Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona (Spain) 
Contact Address:  
Vito Dumas 284. San Fernando, Buenos Aires (Argentina). CP1644 
veronicagottau@hotmail.com 
 
 
 
 
 
 
